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Abstract: The executive and the legislative arms, working in harmony, are vital for the 
attainment of democratic and good governance and the much vaunted dividends of 
democracy. In this context, it is also axiomatic that a non-cooperative relation between 
the two has ominous implications for democratic growth. In the area of budgeting and 
in line with the principles of separation of powers that characterized most presidential 
systems, the 1999 Nigerian constitution has vested the executive and the legislature 
with different powers over national budgets. However, trends have shown that 
budgeting issues have been a major source of antagonism between the two arms, 
especially, under the reigns of President Obasanjo. It is in this light that this paper 
examines the fundamental basis of disagreement between the executive and legislature 
at the national level in Nigeria over budgetary matters. It may be reasoned, for now, 
that at the heart of this conflict lies a wrong appreciation of institutional roles and 
responsibilities between the two arms.  
Keywords: Democracy, Presidential System, Budget, Oversight 
 
Introduction 
Nigeria is an emerging democratic 
system. This is coming up after a 
long and tortuous walk through the 
ages: from anti-colonial struggles 
prior to independence in 1960 and in 
later years, through the woods of 
military autocracy, by political and 
governmental instability, various 
forms of conflicts, threat to national 
cohesion, and a declining economic 
fortune. This has been well 
documented in literature (see, 
Dudley, 1973; Tamuno 1970; 
Osaghae, 1998, Akinwumi 2004). 
Democracy, which is a system that 
is, principally, anchored on the 
informed and active participation of 
the citizens, promotion of rule of law 
and fundamental human rights of the 
citizens, generally lends a sense of 
appeal to virtually all countries of the 
world. Thus, it has acquired a 
universal respectability as the 
superior way of organising the 
government of a country 
(Ogunsanwo, 2003) much as it 
continues to gain appropriation by 
different ideological leanings. Olowu 
et al (1995) observed that 
developments within the 
international system have generated 
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a situation in which the democratic 
ferment cannot but be inevitable. 
Consequently, through decisive 
changes in democratic directions in 
Spain and other Mediterranean 
countries (Western Europe) in the 
mid 1970s; in Latin America in the 
1980s and; in Eastern Europe 
between 1989 and 1991 (see, 
Hademins 1997; Isaac 1989), the 
new democratization wave equally 
found its way into Africa especially 
sub-Saharan Africa from the early 
1990s. Although international 
pressure for democratisation was a 
major factor in the 
institutionalisation of democratic 
government in Nigeria, the resilience 
of Nigerians themselves cannot be 
denied. Thus in spite of what seems 
to be an „endless transition‟ to 
democratic rule (Diamond et al., 
1997) beginning from the 1990s 
coupled with the harsh terrain of 
military dictatorship through the 
period, Nigeria emerged as a 
democratic country in 1999 
following the conduct of a general 
election in April and eventual 
swearing-in of a civilian President in 
May. 
 
It is important to stress that for 
democracy to thrive in Nigeria, as 
elsewhere, it requires a set of 
meditating institutions through 
which differences are harmonised for 
effective realisation of the goals of 
democracy. These include formal 
institutions of the state such as the 
legislature, executive and judiciary 
as well as semi public institutions 
like political parties, interest / 
pressure groups, trade unions and 
other arms of the civil society. The 
centrality of these institutions to 
sustaining democratic practice and 
values lies in their proximate role in 
the input and out processes of public 
policy making and implementation. 
It equally needs to be stated that 
while both public and semi public 
institutions are critical agents in the 
democratic process, the legislature 
and the executive working in 
consonance tend to be more vital in 
making meaning out of any 
democratic practice. Traditionally, 
the legislature makes laws, including 
appropriation laws while the 
executive, through its several 
agencies, translate such laws into 
concrete actions and programmes. 
This mutuality of responsibility is 
usually fostered by a feeling of 
mutual indispensability in policy 
making and implementation by both 
arms of government, proper 
understanding of institutional roles 
and a host of other factors that help 
eschew discordant tunes among 
them. The absence of these fostering 
agents, it should be noted, usually, 
under-lies executive-legislature 
conflict conceived in the traditional 
sense of disaggregate interest among 
the arms. There is no doubt that 
budgeting issue was a volatile one 
between the legislative and the 
executive arms at the federal level in 
Nigeria between 1999 and 2007. On 
the one hand, this may be 
understandable given the centrality 
of budgeting to public policy making 
and implementation and the overall 
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efficiency and effectiveness of the 
government (see Eminue, 2006). On 
the other hand, however, the 
tendency for budgeting issues to 
easily assume the dimension of a 
scourge leaves much to be desired. 
This has been the case with virtually 
all appropriation bills in the country 
between 1999 and 2007, forcing the 
president at times to withhold his 
assent to the bills. The usual 
consequences are delays in passing 
appropriation bills, horse trading/ 
media war between the two arms and 
above all, slow pace of governmental 
activities. It is against this 
background that this paper examines 
relationship between the executive 
and the legislature at the federal level 
in Nigeria under President Olusegun 
Obasanjo. 
 
Budget and Budgeting Process in 
Nigeria 
The budgeting process is one that 
largely involves governmental actors 
in its formulation and 
implementation. Although there have 
been concerns in some countries or 
quarters for an inclusive or 
participatory budgeting process 
(Government-Civil Society 
Partnership Programme, 2007; Langa 
and Jerome, 2004) – such that 
transcends state actors alone, 
majority of countries and indeed 
scholars (Posner and Park 2007; 
Daggash, 2006) still recognize the 
principal organs of government 
(specifically, the executive and the 
legislature) as the main actors in 
budgeting. This perhaps informs 
Azuta-Mba‟s (2008) conception of 
the budget process as the various set 
of steps taken in budget preparation 
from the executive to the legislature. 
Although the executive initiates the 
budget process, the role of the 
legislature in the entire process has 
been more stressed. Also, it has been 
noted that such roles by the 
legislature in the budgeting process 
varies from one political system to 
another (Lienert, 2005, 2010; 
Stapenhurst, 2004). Irrespective of 
the variations that may exist, 
however, the budgeting process lies 
at the heart of executive legislature 
relations especially in presidential 
systems. Posner and parker (2007) 
have also notes that the nature of 
power configuration between the 
executive and the legislature has a 
major impact on executive 
legislature relations in the budgeting 
process. According to them, in the 
presidential system characterized, as 
it were, by separation of powers, the 
legislature has a significant role in 
policy formulation and in budgeting 
partly, because of its electoral 
constituency that is different from 
that of the president. This is unlike 
the case in the parliamentary system 
where the power of the legislature is 
arguably weaker. This is because 
under the parliamentary system, the 
executive leadership is drawn from 
the legislature much as the 
legislature is politically obligated to 
support the government.  
 
Opinion seems to converge on the 
processes involved in national 
budgeting. Azuta-Mbata (2006), 
Nzekwu (2006), Barkan et al (2004) 
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have recognized four processes of 
the budgeting process. These roughly 
approximates to formulation stage, 
approval stage, implementation stage 
and auditing.  Noteworthy is that 
each stage involves a complex set of 
processes and actors. For instance in 
Nigeria, the formulation stage is 
driven by the executive through the 
Budget Office of the Federation 
(BOF). The BOF, situated within the 
Ministry of Finance, is an executive 
agency primarily concerned with 
providing necessary technical 
support on the preparation of annual 
budgets of the federation. The steps 
involved in the preparation of the 
annual budget include, developing 
medium term revenue framework, 
that is estimation of revenues that 
will accrue to the nation from 
different sources; development of 
medium term expenditure framework 
which means determining maximum 
spend-able amount and allocation to 
different expenditure heads; Budget 
Call Circular to Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies (MDAs); 
Evaluation and consolidation of 
submissions from MDAs and 
presentation of draft budget to Mr. 
President for subsequent 
transmission to the National 
Assembly. This leads to the second 
stage in the budget process, that is, 
approval stage. In line with 
constitutional requirement, the 
President lays before the National 
Assembly, the budget draft for the 
next fiscal year (also called 
appropriation bill). The National 
Assembly examines the estimates 
and where necessary, makes 
amendment. This is also in line with 
constitutional duties of the 
legislature as provided for in the 
1999 constitution. It is also 
noteworthy that in the course of 
exercising its powers over budget, 
the two Houses of the National 
Assembly also go through some 
steps and processes similar to the 
regular process of law-making. 
These include, First Reading; second 
reading which, is a general 
discussion on policies and principles 
of the bill, Consideration by relevant 
standing committees which also send 
their reports to the Finance and 
Appropriation Committee. (FAC)   
 
Upon receipt of recommendations 
from various committees, the FAC 
may decide to organize public 
hearings on the proposed budget 
before submitting its report to 
committee of the whole House which 
considers and approves the bill. For 
the purpose of harmonization and to 
resolve grey areas, a joint meeting of 
the FAC of both Houses of the 
National Assembly meets to 
reconcile any differences in their 
respective approved estimates. This 
is followed in each House by Third 
Reading leading to the passage of the 
Appropriation Bill. Like every other 
bill, it is sent to the president for his 
assent after which it becomes an 
appropriation Act. The Third stage 
which is the implementation stage is 
the action stage in the budget 
process. This stage involves the 
release of approved estimates to 
MDA to implement approved 
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projects and services. It is indeed the 
action stage of government because 
it requires translation of policy 
statements into concrete programmes 
of government and it is the stage 
where the actions and inactions of 
government are felt by the citizens. 
Also at this stage, actions of 
government can be seen, felt or 
touched.  The chains of activities at 
this stage provide the necessary input 
to engage in the Fourth and perhaps 
the last stage in the budget process. 
That is, Auditing and evaluation 
stage. It is important to stress that 
this stage also involves actions by 
both the executive and the legislative 
arms. On the one hand, the 
executive, through the BOF, Office 
of the Accountant-General of the 
Federation (OAGF) and the National 
Planning Commission (NPC) carry 
out periodic assessment of 
performance of the budget in any 
fiscal year. On the other hand, the 
National Assembly, through its 
public Accounts Committees (PAC) 
and other relevant committees, carry 
out oversight of budget 
implementation through periodic 
enquiries on MDAs 
 
Executive Legislature Relations in 
Nigeria Prior to 1999 
As earlier noted in this work, Nigeria 
emerged at independence in 1960 as 
a parliamentary democracy. Central 
to this system is the fusion of 
governmental powers among the 
branches of government. In this case, 
there was no clear cut distinction 
between, for instance, the members 
of the legislature (parliament) and 
the executive (cabinet). Indeed, 
members of cabinet also constituted 
members of parliament much as the 
prime minister was empowered to 
advise the Head of State to dissolve 
the parliament and call for fresh 
elections. This practice which was 
equally instituted at the regional 
levels gave no room for any serious 
antagonism between the legislature 
and the executive. This system was 
however truncated with the military 
incursion of 1966 as it was 
abandoned in favour of the 
Presidential system at the country‟s 
return to democratic rule in 1979. 
For detailed account of how the 
parliamentary system operated in 
Nigeria and the attendant problems 
see, Benjamin (2004). 
At inception of the Second Republic 
under the Presidential democracy 
variant, there was, initially, no 
serious conflict between the 
executive arm and the legislature 
even though the then ruling National 
Party of Nigeria (NPN) was not in 
control of overwhelming majority in 
the National Assembly. This stems 
from its alliance with the Nigerian 
People‟s Party (NPP). As long as the 
alliance lasted, the relationship 
between the executive and the 
legislature seems cordial as 
evidenced in the hasty passage, in 
less than two hours, of the Economic 
Stabilization (temporary provisions) 
Bill of 1982 (Akinsanya and Davies, 
2002). However, with the collapse of 
the alliance, conflicting situations 
began to emerge in executive - 
legislature relations. Given the initial 
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context and settings within which the 
assembly was, this trend can be 
attributed to the differences in party 
affiliation of members rather than to 
any serious contemplation about the 
implications of a particular 
government (executive) action. Thus 
several other proposals that would 
improve governmental efficiency 
and the general welfare of the people 
were blocked (Maduagu and Oche 
1992; Aiyede and Isumonah, 2002; 
Akinsaya and Davies 2002). In other 
words, the transference of party 
antagonism into affairs of the 
National Assembly was a major 
factor in the emergence of friction 
between the legislature and the 
executive under Nigeria‟s Second 
Republic. 
 
Under the aborted Third Republic, 
the nature and circumstances of the 
Republic coupled with the fact that it 
was truncated did not provide ample 
opportunities for observing definite 
trends in executive – legislature 
conflict. Commenting on situations 
at the national level during this 
period, Aiyede and Isumonah (2002), 
argue that the exchanges between the 
National Assembly and the executive 
branch (which in this case was 
military) up till the period of the 
annulment of the June 12, 1993 
election epitomises an epoch in 
legislative humiliation. This stems 
from the fact that first; decree no. 53 
with which the Assembly was 
inaugurated equally „castrated it by 
limiting the powers to debating only 
cultural and topographical matters‟ 
(Aiyede and Isumonah, 2002). 
Second, it was an era of subjugation 
of all democratic ethoses and free 
will of the citizens to military 
autocracy because even though there 
were elements of democratisation, all 
was still subject to military fiat. 
Indeed at a point, the country was 
operating a diarchy. 
 
At the state level, although there 
were civilian heads existing 
alongside the state assemblies, the 
military influence still pervaded. 
This is because, apart from the fact 
that some state chief executives saw 
themselves wielding enormous 
powers over the legislature, the 
Babangida military regime equally 
directed the state governors to 
disregard the houses of Assembly 
where there was clash of interest. 
The understanding in this context 
was to avoid a situation where 
Assembly men would be demanding 
for “settlements” before executive 
proposals were considered and 
approved.   
In effect, however, this was a 
continuation of the subjugation and 
perversion of democratic structures 
in which case, the legislature was the 
most affected. Perhaps if the 
Republic had survived beyond the 
military junta, other important trends 
in executive – legislature relations 
could have been visible. 
 
The 1999 Constitution and 
Budgeting Process  
In Nigeria and within the context of 
its presidential system, the 1999 
constitution sets the tone for 
interaction between the executive 
and the legislature on the national 
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budgeting process. For instance, by 
virtue of Part I E spanning sections 
80 to 89 of the 1999 Constitution it 
is the National Assembly that gives 
authorization to the executive for all 
expenditures from the consolidated 
Revenue Fund. In the case of the 
states of the federation, sections 120 
and 121 vests such powers in the 
state houses of Assembly. Relevant 
sections under this provision 
deserves extensive quote from the 
constitution. In section 80, the 
constitution provides that: 
 
All revenues or other moneys 
raised or received by the 
Federation (not being 
revenues or other moneys 
payable under this 
Constitution or any Act of the 
National Assembly into any 
other public fund of the 
Federation established for a 
specific purpose) shall be 
paid into and form one 
Consolidated Revenue Fund 
of the Federation (subsection 
1) 
Similarly, 
No moneys shall be 
withdrawn from the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund 
of the Federation except to 
meet expenditure that is 
charged upon the fund by this 
Constitution or where the 
issue of those moneys has 
been authorised by an 
Appropriation Act, 
Supplementary Appropriation 
Act or an Act passed in 
pursuance of section 81 of 
this Constitution.  
 
In addition, subsections 3 and 4 of 
the constitution give the National 
Assembly the exclusive right of 
approving any withdrawal from the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund or any 
other public fund of the federation. 
Section 81 describes obligations of 
the in the Budgetary process by 
noting that:  
The President shall cause to 
be prepared and laid before 
each House of the National 
Assembly at any time in each 
financial year estimates of the 
revenues and expenditure of 
the Federation for the next 
following financial year 
(subsection 1)  
Also, subsection 2 states that,  
 
The heads of expenditure 
contained in the estimates … 
shall be included in a bill, to 
be known as an Appropriation 
Bill, providing for the issue 
from the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund of the sums 
necessary to meet that 
expenditure and the 
appropriation of those sums 
for the purposes specified 
therein. 
 
The constitution also envisaged a 
situation where in „respect of any 
financial year it is found that‟ „the 
amount appropriated by the 
Appropriation Act for any purpose is 
insufficient; or a need has arisen for 
expenditure for a purpose for which 
no amount has been appropriated by 
the Act (subsection 4). In this case, 
 
a supplementary estimate 
showing the sums required 
shall be laid before each 
House of the National 
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Assembly and the heads of any 
such expenditure shall be 
included in a Supplementary 
Appropriation Bill. 
In line with  the idea of separate but 
interdependent powers and the 
objective of avoiding stalemate in 
governance, the constitution under 
section 82 provides that where the 
Appropriation Bill in respect of any 
financial year has not been passed 
into law by the beginning of the 
financial year, 
the President may authorise 
the withdrawal of moneys in 
the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund of the Federation for the 
purpose of meeting 
expenditure necessary to carry 
on the services of the 
Government of the Federation 
for a period not exceeding six 
months or until the coming 
into operation of the 
Appropriation Act, whichever 
is the earlier: Provided that the 
withdrawal in respect of any 
such period shall not exceed 
the amount authorised to be 
withdrawn from the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund of 
the Federation under the 
provisions of the 
Appropriation Act passed by 
the National Assembly for the 
corresponding period in the 
immediately preceding 
financial year. 
Although the constitution intended 
well with these provision, it later 
became an instrument of 
manipulation by the actors in the 
course of formulating and approving 
the national budget.  Also in line 
with the idea of avoiding stalemate 
in governance, the constitution vests 
the National Assembly with powers 
to „make provisions for the 
establishment of a Contingencies 
Fund for the Federation‟ where the 
President can draw fund where there 
is an urgent and unforeseen need for 
expenditure for which no other 
provision exists. However, even 
where such has occurred, a 
Supplementary Estimate shall be 
presented and a Supplementary 
Appropriation Bill be introduced as 
soon as possible for the purpose of 
replacing the amount so advanced 
from the contingency fund after due 
approval by the National Assembly.  
 
It is pertinent to observe that 
although the legislature has the 
constitutional power of approval or 
what may be described as power of 
the purse, the constitution has also 
offered guidelines for the exercise of 
this power especially considering the 
bicameral nature of the national 
legislature. According to section 59 
of the constitution, where a bill is 
passed by one of the Houses but is 
not passed by the other House within 
a period of two months from the 
commencement of a financial year, 
the President of the Senate shall 
within fourteen days thereafter 
arrange for and convene a meeting of 
the joint finance committee to 
examine the bill with a view to 
resolving the differences between the 
two Houses. It went further under 
subsection 3 that "when the joint 
finance committee failing to resolve 
such differences, the bill shall be 
presented to the National Assembly 
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sitting at a joint meeting, and if the 
bill is passed at such joint meeting, it 
shall be presented to the President 
for assent. 
 
Although such extreme situation has 
hardly arisen in the Nigerian context, 
it nonetheless shows a kind of 
attempt at intra institutional 
balancing between both arms of the 
National Assembly. 
 
It is not enough that money should 
be appropriated but must be ensured 
to be fully utilized as passed by the 
National Assembly.  This implies 
auditing or oversight of 
governmental activities in respect of 
the appropriation bill. As is evident, 
this is an exclusive and important 
function of the legislature and which 
brings it in direct contact with the 
executive arm and its agencies. In 
this case, the office of the 
Accountant-General and the Auditor-
General established by the 
constitution becomes most relevant 
as much of the work at this level is 
based on the Auditor general‟s 
report.. According to section 85, the 
public accounts of the Federation 
and of all offices and courts of the 
Federation shall be audited and 
reported on to the Auditor-General 
who shall submit his reports to each 
house of the National Assembly; 
within ninety days of receipt of the 
Accountant-General's financial 
statement. Upon receipt of the report, 
the National Assembly is expected to 
consider it through its appropriate 
committees. Essentially, the relevant 
committees are to review whether 
public money was spent for the 
approved purposes and with due 
regard to efficiency, economy and 
effectiveness. It is also important to 
state that at the sittings of the 
relevant committees, the Accounting 
Officer (Permanent Secretary) of the 
audited Ministry or Office. is usually 
in attendance and is expected to 
defend itself on any issue reported on 
and explain what they have done in 
response to the Report This way, the 
National Assembly is able to 
determine the level of compliance by 
the executive in the implementation 
of the appropriation law as passed by 
it.  
 
To boost the above powers, Section 
88 also states inter alia that each 
House of the National Assembly 
shall have power to direct or cause to 
be directed investigation into the 
conduct of affairs of any person, 
authority, ministry or government 
department charged, or intended to 
be charged, with the duty of or 
responsibility for executing or 
administering laws enacted by 
National Assembly, and disbursing 
or administering moneys 
appropriated or to be appropriated by 
the National Assembly. Also, these 
powers are to enable the National 
Assembly, among other things to 
„expose corruption, inefficiency or 
waste in the execution or 
administration of laws within its 
legislative competence and in the 
disbursement or administration of 
funds appropriated by it‟ 
In other words, going by the 
wordings of the constitution, while 
the appropriation bill represents the 
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executive‟s master plan for monies 
to be spent at a specified period of 
time, such must be approved by the 
legislature before any expenditure is 
made. Equally, the constitution has, 
through these extensive provisions, 
recognized on the one hand main 
actors involved in the budget process 
as comprising both the legislative 
and executive arms and its agencies 
and on the other hand, it has laid 
procedures for the budgeting process 
that includes preparation / 
formulation, approval, 
implementation and auditing / 
oversight. Aside from these, other 
observations that derive from the 
constitutional provision include, 
streamlining all revenues accruing to 
the federation into a Consolidate 
Revenue Fund (CRF) from which all 
expenditure will be drawn and that it 
is the legislature that has 
constitutional power to authorize 
expenditure from the fund. Given 
these provisions, therefore, Aiyede 
and Isumonoh (2002) were right to 
conclude that the 1999 Nigerian 
constitution envisions a budgeting 
process that is typical of presidential 
system of government where the 
executive and legislative arms were 
both autonomous and 
interdependent. It also suffices to say 
that it is within this framework that 
both arms were relating over the 
national budget during the period 
under consideration.  
 
 
 
Executive Legislature Relation in 
the Budget Process under 
President Obasanjo 
May 29, 1999 marked a watershed in 
the history of Nigeria. It was the day 
when the country emerged as a new 
democracy based on the Presidential 
variant which it began experimenting 
with since 1979. Accordingly, after 
the general elections of April same 
year, a new Executive President was 
sworn-in on May 29, while the 
legislative arm was inaugurated by 
the President on June 16, 1999. With 
this, the essential democratic 
structures were finally consummated. 
As with all Presidential systems, 
especially the America model after 
which the Nigerian system was 
fashioned, the three powers of 
government are vested in various 
arms. That is, the legislative, the 
executive and the judiciary. These 
are contained in sections 4, 5 and 6 
of the 1999 constitution of the 
federal Republic of Nigeria 
respectively. The constitution 
equally established the framework 
for relations between the arms and 
most especially between the 
executive and the legislature both of 
which constitute the hub of public 
policy making and delivery. The link 
between the legislative and the 
executive arms revolves around 
virtually all the areas of primary 
responsibility of the former. These 
are law making which includes 
appropriation laws, confirmation of 
appointments and oversight of the 
executive and it agencies. This 
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notwithstanding, our focus here is on 
the National Budget. 
 
From various budget presentation 
speeches by the president to joint 
session of the National Assembly as 
directed by the constitution, it could 
be gleaned that the objectives of the 
budget usually revolve around 
resolving the multitude of economic 
challenges facing the country which 
include lowering the inflation rate, 
laying a solid foundation for private 
sector led economic growth and, 
reduce unemployment and poverty 
among others. As already noted, 
provisions of the 1999 constitution 
of Nigeria approximates the process 
of national budgets to four main 
actions. That is, formulation; 
approval; implementation and; audit 
of the budget. It is pertinent, 
however, to observe that while the 
process of formulation and 
implementation are in the strictest 
sense, an executive domain, the 
process of approval and oversight 
actively involves the legislature. 
Also, the two areas of legislature‟s 
involvement are what usually result 
in antagonisms between the two 
arms. That is, the process of approval 
which involves scrutiny of 
executive‟s proposal and, oversight 
of the budget.  
 
It is also worthy to note that conflicts 
between the executive and the 
legislature over budgets started right 
from inception of the administration 
but became full blown in 2000. As 
rightly observed by the IMF (2001),  
 
for much of 2000, the 
government was involved in a 
bitter political battle with the 
National Assembly-in essence, 
to delineate the boundaries of 
their respective authorities 
under the new democracy. At 
stake, among other issues, was 
the responsibility of the 
executive vis-a-vis the 
legislature in the formulation, 
implementation, and monitoring 
of the federal government 
budget. 
 
This trend runs through the various 
budgets from 1999 to the end of the 
administration in 2007.  
One fundamental issue that brings 
disagreement and which often 
produce conflict between the 
executive and the legislature in the 
budgetary process is in the 
discrepancy that exists between the 
amount budgeted by the executive 
and the amount eventually approved 
by the National Assembly. This 
discrepancy has occurred in all the 
national budgets for the period under 
consideration as the table below 
shows. 
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                           Table I: Discrepancies in Budget Amount 
Year  Amount Budgeted Amount Passed 
2000 407. 0 billion 677.5 billion 
2001 894.21 billion 894.2 billion 
2002 840.85 billion 1.06 trillion 
2003 765.13 billion 979.2 billion 
2004 1.22 trillion 1.30 trillion 
2005 1.61 trillion 1.80 trillion 
2006 1.88 trillion 1.90 trillion 
 
Source: Computed by the Authors from Mr. President‟s  
Annual Budget Speech and Annul Appropriation Acts  
by the National Assembly 
 
 
Indications as to why the National 
Assembly often carry out changes on 
executive budget proposal was given 
by Jibrin Barau, one time Chairman 
House committee on Appropriation . 
According to him, the reason 
adduced for the upward review by 
the legislature was the urgent and 
dire need for the government to 
assuage the electorate‟s thirst for 
democracy dividend. He also added 
that since 1999, Nigerians had 
waited in vain for the touted 
democracy dividend. Hence the 
decision of the National Assembly to 
review the budget through larger 
allocation of funds (The Guardian, 
Sunday August 4, 2002). 
Unfortunately, the executive seem to 
be averse to such increase. 
As with the approval process, 
budgetary oversight have also 
remained tension soaked in the 
relationship between the two arms of 
government. In specific terms, the 
legislature has always accused the 
executive of shoddy or non 
implementation of national budgets 
to the extent that through out the 
period under consideration, the 
country never attained a 100 per cent 
budget implementation (see table II). 
Indeed, while debating the 2001 
appropriation bill at the floor of the 
senate, allegations of shoddy 
implementation of previous budgets 
also stalled debates on the 2001 
Appropriation Act as majority view 
any venture in the 2001 
Appropriation Act as „an exercise in 
futility‟ (Senate Hanzards, 28 
November, 2000). 
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Table II: Percentage Implementation of Annual Budget, 2000 - 2006 
Year  % Implementation  
2000 89.72* 
2001 91.37* 
2002 NA 
2003 35%** 
2004 95%** 
2005 55%** 
2006 NA 
Source: Computed by the Authors from various sources  
* Presidents Response to Impeachment Allegations 
** Hamlai, (2006) NA = Not Available 
 
But giving the fact that both the 
legislature and the executive are to 
operate within stipulated 
constitutional frameworks, we may 
pause to ponder what the 
fundamental basis of this conflict 
are? First is that there seem to be a 
poor perception of constitutional 
roles by the two arms of government. 
Put differently, both arms fail to 
understand the limits of their 
constitutional exercise of power as 
well as appreciate the extent of the 
other arms powers. For instance, on 
the issue of appropriation, the 
constitution provides in section 80 
(3) and (4) that no moneys shall be 
withdrawn from the consolidated 
revenue fund of the federation except 
with approval of the NASS and such 
must also be spent in the manner 
prescribed by the NASS. Similarly,    
the constitution also in section 81 
places the power to prepare such 
amount to be expended in the 
executive arm. The implication of 
the above sections is that only the 
NASS has the right to authorise any 
form of expenditure from the 
federation account while the 
executive has the exclusive power to 
propose and (after approval), 
implement. However, this 
constitutional delineation of 
responsibilities remains lost to both 
actors as they tend to encroach on 
each others domain. For instance, 
more often than not, the National 
Assembly unilaterally increases 
some budgetary allocations in the 
executive‟s proposal as indicated in 
table 1 above while the executive too 
at times jump the gun on some issues 
requiring prior legislative approval.  
 
Ordinarily, where situations like this 
occur, it beholds the judiciary to 
intervene. But a situation where none 
of the parties is willing to approach 
the court, the judiciary cannot on its 
own, make a pronouncement in such 
respect. There is no such power 
conferred on the judiciary in the 
Nigerian constitution. This is a 
lacuna that requires re-examination. 
Thus, the essential factor lies in their 
failure to engender mutual 
understanding and appreciation of 
each other and inability of the 
judiciary to respond to the challenge.  
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Conclusion  
This study has attempted to examine 
the pattern of executive – legislature 
relations in Nigeria‟s Presidential 
democracy with a special focus on 
the budgeting process. Nigeria‟s 
constitutions (starting with the 1979 
constitution) provide the 
constitutional framework for relation 
between the legislature and the 
executive. It is however observed 
that while the constitution has laid 
down sufficient basis for functional 
relation in the budgeting process, 
reality has proved a contrasting 
situation. On one hand, recent trends 
in the budgeting process which have 
assumed the dimension of a scourge 
could be partly explained by the 
failure of both institutions to 
understand and respect the 
boundaries of their respective powers 
and partly within the inability of the 
Judiciary to savage the situation. All 
are not without ominous threats to 
the Nigerian state.  
 
Against this background and to stem 
the tide of conflict between the two 
arms on budget issues, it is expedient 
that first, both should keep within the 
boundaries of their respective 
competencies as stipulated by the 
constitution. In this regard, each arm 
needs to acquire sufficient 
information about the functions and 
workings of the other. This will also 
provide opportunities for 
appreciating each other. Although 
the National Assembly has set-up a 
policy „think thank‟ (that is, the 
National Institute of Legislative 
Studies) to facilitate its legislative 
roles, but there is the need for 
synergy between this institution and 
similar institution in the Presidency 
for concrete achievements to be 
made. Second, in cases where there 
are doubts or disagreements, both 
parties should be willing to resort to 
the court which is expected to give 
the right interpretation in 
controversial situations. All these are 
necessary in order to stem the tide of 
executive – legislature conflicts in 
Nigeria‟s democracy. 
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